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If access to credit is limited (especially when young or unemployed) but ”bad” jobs are
easy to come by, then job seekers might use short term employment in undesirable jobs
as a way to ﬁnance consumption during subsequent unemployed search for a “good” job.
In this paper we explore this idea in two ways. First, we document empirical patterns of
short term employment and asset accumulation among job seekers. Second, we build a
theoretical model of job search by risk averse, credit constrained agents. In this model
we are able to demonstrate analytically that voluntary planned quits can occur as agents
cycle between accumulating assets in short term employment and unemployed search for
more desirable employment.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D83, D91, J64
Keywords: Unemployment, Search, Consumption, Assets1 Introduction
Economists have long known that entrants to the labour market exhibit high turnover
(for example, Topel and Ward, 1992, and Neal, 1999). A growing literature documents
the propensity of workers who lose jobs to move to temporary employment, to have sub-
sequent separations, and to move into part-time or otherwise unsatisfactory employment.
For example, Farber (1999) shows that displaced workers commonly take up temporary
jobs and “involuntary” part-time jobs, and Boheim and Taylor (2002) show that jobs
that follow an unemployment spell have shorter average durations than other jobs. Far-
ber further shows that the probability of temporary or part-time work falls with time
since displacement, suggesting that these arrangements are part of a transitional process
back to desirable employment.1 How can apparently unsatisfactory employment aid the
transition to more desirable jobs? Suppose access to credit is limited (especially when
young or unemployed) but that “bad” jobs are easy to come by. In such an environment,
j o bs e e k e r sm i g h tu s es h o r tt e r me m p l o y m e n ti nu n d e s i r a b l ej o b sa saw a yt oﬁnance
consumption during periods of search for a “good” job. We explore this idea in two ways.
The ﬁrst half of the paper presents an empirical analysis of short term employment, con-
sumption and saving after job loss. While a number of studies document the prevalence
of short-term and temporary work (see above), we are not aware of any previous analysis
that examines the empirical relationships between consumption, saving and short term
1Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) provide a recent analysis of the general incidence of temporary
jobs in the U.K. These authors, and others, use “temporary job” to refer to ﬁxed term contracts. We
will use “temporary employment” and “short term employment” to refer more generally to employment
spells of limited duration, including spells that end with a quit.
1employment after job loss. In the second part of the paper we construct a theoretical
model of job search by risk averse, credit constrained agents in an environment where
“bad” jobs are readily available. In this model we demonstrate analytically that volun-
tary planned quits can occur as agents cycle between accumulating assets in short term
employment and unemployed search for a more desirable employment. As the reader will
recognise, our presentation is somewhat unusual in that we ﬁrst present some empirical
results and then a theory that is designed to rationalise these (and other) ﬁndings. At
present the theory is not suﬃciently general to allow us to estimate a credible structural
model of job search, temporary employment and asset accumulation.
The empirical analysis, in Section 2 of the paper, is based on the 1995 Canadian
Out of Employment Panel. This survey has an unusually broad coverage which allows
us to document patterns of labour force transitions, consumption and saving after job
loss. Beginning with labour force transitions, we show that quits into unemployment
do occur. We also document (like Farber) the extensive use of temporary jobs after job
loss. Turning to consumption and spending, we ﬁnd that the expenditure level (mea-
sured as a fraction of pre-displacement expenditures) of workers in temporary, unsatis-
f a c t o r ye m p l o y m e n ti sm a r k e d l yd i ﬀerent from those of workers who report being back
in “good” jobs. The distribution of proportional expenditure changes among workers in
temporary, unsatisfactory employment is actually quite similar to the distribution among
unemployed job-searching individuals. However, temporary workers have higher incomes
than searchers and thus, they have higher savings rates. This observation seems counter-
intuitive: “permanent income” models suggest that those with temporarily low incomes
2should have high average propensities to consume. On the other hand, it is consistent
with the idea that temporary employment is used to ﬁnance subsequent search.
The idea that credit constrained job seekers use short term, “bad” jobs to ﬁnance
further search is not readily incorporated into the standard search models that inform
much thinking about unemployment. In particular, employment in such models is per-
manent (unless there is a subsequent shock) and job seekers are assumed to have risk
neutral preferences and hence maximize the expected utility of the present discounted
value of income less costs. This speciﬁcation implies that the pattern of consumption
is either indeterminate or completely insured. It also generates a stationary reservation
wage strategy. A wage oﬀer rejected today will not be acceptable in the future and any
accepted job opportunity will always be preferred to further search (Mortensen, 1986).
As a result, the transition rate from unemployment into employment does not vary with
t h ed u r a t i o no fs e a r c ho rw i t hd i ﬀe r e n c e si nw e a l t h .I na d d i t i o n ,w o r k e r si ns u c ha ne n -
vironment only leave a job if they ﬁnd a better opportunity (through on-the-job search)
or if the employment relationship changes in some way so that the payoﬀ to continued
work becomes less productive than the return to search.
For risk averse job seekers without full insurance, much of this characterization does
not apply. In this case, the optimal pattern of consumption becomes well deﬁned. Indi-
viduals with higher assets consume more. In addition, the job acceptance decision also
depends on the individual’s asset levels although further restrictions on the degree of
risk aversion are needed to characterize this relationship. Job seekers with decreasing
absolute risk aversion become pickier as assets increase (the reservation wage declines
3with asset holdings). As a result, wealthier individuals search longer and hence tend to
match with higher paying jobs (Danforth, 1979). In addition, as risk averse job seekers
consume from assets and become less picky, they may on occasion want to recall previ-
ously rejected oﬀers (Hall, Lippman and McCall, 1979). However, as with risk neutral
job search, employment is permanent: unless something changes for the worker, there are
no job-to-unemployment transitions.
In contrast, in the model developed in the second part of the paper, credit constraints
can give rise to employment-to-unemployment turnover. Lacking the ability to borrow
or insure, risk averse individuals become willing to accept readily available, low wage
“bad” jobs in order to accumulate assets which subsequently fund search for high wage
“good” jobs. If the ensuing search for high wage employment proves unsuccessful and
assets become depleted, these individuals then take up bad jobs again and repeat the
cycle. Bad jobs act as a ﬂoor or safety net for those who are unsuccessful at job search
and do not have the ability to borrow. As a result, temporary employment in bad jobs
g e n e r a t e sq u i t sw i t h o u ts h o c k st op r o d u c t i v i ty or in the job search process. Job seekers
would prefer borrowing against future income to fund consumption during search rather
than using low wage work to build assets. Credit constraints prevent such behavior and
hence take on a central role in the determination of income distribution. Rather than
limit human capital investment as often discussed in the literature, here they restrict the
extent of search and thereby the ﬂow of workers into desirable high wage jobs. Section
3 develops our model of short term employment and asset accumulation. The central
result is that in such a model, cycles of search and temporary employment can arise
4endogenously.
Section 3 also theoretically analyzes the eﬀects of changes in turnover costs and wages.
In our model turnover costs play a key role in determining asset accumulation as well as
the durations of employment and job search. In particular, higher turnover costs lead to
a longer employment spells in low wage jobs. While in these bad jobs, individuals facing
high turnover costs accumulate a larger stock of assets but save a slower rate. When they
do search, they are more cautious. They run down assets at a slower rate (by consuming
less) and thereby search longer. Section 4 contains a concluding discussion.
2 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis is based on the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP).
These surveys sample from the ﬂow out of jobs and are intended to be representative of
those who experienced a job separation in particular windows of time. The 1995 COEP
had 3898 respondents in a ﬁrst cohort (with separations between January and March
1995) and 3996 respondents in a second cohort (with separations between April and June
1995). Respondents completed two telephone interviews, conducted in approximately
the 3rd and 5th quarter after job loss. Two features of the COEP data are particularly
useful for our purposes. First, because they sample from the ﬂow of job separations they
contain unusually detailed information on these transitions. Second, the survey is unusual
in that it contains data on expenditures after job loss, which allow us to relate patterns of
consumption and savings to short term employment. Additional details about the COEP
5surveys can be found in Browning and Crossley (2001a).
The COEP sampled almost all kinds of job separations2 and the ﬂow out of employ-
ment is very heterogeneous. Table 1 documents aspects of this heterogeneity. We initially
deleted the 6% of respondents who reported continuing employment in a second job across
the job loss. Of the remaining sample, respondents who reported being laid oﬀ due to
business conditions are the largest group (see the last two columns of Table 1). But they
constitute only 25% of the sample. There are also signiﬁcant numbers who reported that
they were in a temporary or seasonal job; that they quit, either to take another job or
otherwise; that they were ﬁred or dismissed; or that they left their job due to illness or
injury.
For each of these groups Table 1 presents not just their importance in the sample, but
also aspects of their post-job-loss experience. In particular, we report the median spell of
initial jobless-ness (in weeks); the fraction of the group that searched for a new job after
separation; and two measures of search intensity. Our measures of search intensity are
usual hours per week spent searching and usual weekly job search related expenditures. In
both cases we report the mean for those who report searching. We also report from each
group the fraction that report a geographic move after job separation, and the fraction
that received unemployment insurance beneﬁt.
Table 1 contains a number of striking features. First, after excluding those that quit to
take another job, other quits comprise a small, but not trivial, fraction of the sample (7%).
Moreover, “other” quits (excluding those that quit to take another job) exhibit a median
2For the 1995 COEP Survey, retirement, maternity, labour dispute and return to school as reasons
for separation were treated as out of the scope of our analysis.
6initial spell of jobless-ness, a fraction searching, and measures of search intensity which
are equal to or only slightly below the comparable numbers for respondents who were
laid oﬀ because of business conditions. These “other” quits have a median initial spell of
joblessness of 6 weeks (versus 7 weeks for business conditions layoﬀs) and 58% of them
search for a new job after the separation (versus 72 % for business conditions layoﬀs). If
they search, they spend on average 15 hours per week searching (identical to the business
conditions layoﬀs) and spend on average 32 dollars per week on search related expenses
(versus 34 dollars for business condition layoﬀs.) Thus the data contradict the notion that
quits into unemployment do not occur. Quits do have lower incidence of unemployment
insurance receipt than layoﬀs of any kind. In part this reﬂects the rules of the Canadian
Unemployment Insurance system. Interestingly, these “other” quits (excluding those that
quit to take another job) have the highest rate of geographic mobility of any group in the
data.
A further noteworthy feature of Table 1 is the importance in the ﬂow of job separations
of workers leaving temporary jobs and expiring contracts. This group is almost as large
as the group that best corresponds to traditional notion of job loss (those who were laid
oﬀ due to business cycle conditions). This again emphasizes the importance of short-
term employment, but in a slightly diﬀerent way than the existing literature. In the
model which we develop in the second half of the paper, accepting a job of ﬁxed duration
is equivalent to a planned quit into unemployment (because no information is revealed
during employment.)3
3This would not be true of models in which information - such as the quality of the match - is revealed
7The remainder of our analysis focuses on a restricted sample of “displaced workers”
who were permanently displaced from a full-time job which they had held for at least one
year. One reason to do this is to get a sample of new entrants to the search process (and so
minimize initial conditions problems.) A second reason is that for all such individuals we
get a measure of their household expenditures (consumption) when they are in a “good”
job. We use this quantity to normalize expenditures in other states, as described below.
First, 1.5% of respondents under twenty or over sixty-ﬁve years of age were discarded.
Involuntary separations (laid oﬀ or ﬁred/dismissed) were selected which reduced the
sample by a further 32%. A large fraction (62%) of the layoﬀs in the COEP data reported
that, at the time of the layoﬀ, they had an expectation of recall to the ﬁrm that was
laying them oﬀ. Many also reported that they had a speciﬁc recall date. In order to
focus on displaced workers, respondents who reported such an ex ante expectation of
recall (with or without a recall date) were dropped.4 The ﬁnal sample restriction was to
select respondents who were displaced from stable, full-time employment. About half of
the remaining sample had tenure of less than 52 weeks in the lost job, and these were
dropped. So were the approximately 15% of the sample that had been displaced from a
part-time job. This left a sample of 790 displaced workers. About 16% of these withdrew
from the labour force after job loss. These are not analyzed in what follows.
Table 2 documents short run employment outcomes of displaced workers in the 1995
during a spell of employment.
4Throughout the paper we use the terms “permanent layoﬀ” and “displacement” interchangeably.
Some of the literature uses a tighter deﬁnition of “displaced workers,” limiting the term to those laid oﬀ
as part of a plant closing or other large event.
8COEP. Six to ten months after the loss of a good job, 33.3% are still in the spell of
unemployment that began with that job loss, while 37.6% are in the ﬁrst spell of em-
ployment subsequent to that job loss. The remaining 29.1% of workers are either in a
subsequent unemployment spell or a subsequent employment spell and thus have had
some short-term employment.
Of course, some of those in their ﬁrst spell of employment may also be in a temporary
job. The data allow us to look at this in two ways. First, of those in the ﬁrst spell of
employment subsequent to a job loss, 29.3% do not expect to be in that job for a full
year. Second, a substantially overlapping 24.9% consider this job to be not as good as
the job they lost. Thus, in total, more than a third of workers who lose a permanent
(long tenure) job take some short-term (and unsatisfactory) employment in the ﬁrst three
quarters after displacement. This is work that they either quickly leave or do not expect
to remain in.
We now turn to the consumption and saving patterns among these job losers. Figure
1 displays distributions of proportional changes in household expenditures (consumption)
from before the job loss to the ﬁrst interview. Analyzing this transformation (rather than
expenditure levels) removes heterogeneity across households in pre-displacement expen-
diture levels. Because we take these workers to have been displaced from “good” jobs,
we are eﬀectively normalizing by the level of expenditures in the good job. The sample
is split into four groups: those in their ﬁrst spell of unemployment after a displacement
(UE-1), those in a subsequent spell of unemployment (UE-2), and two groups of employed
who consider their job worse (E-1) or at least as good (E-2) as the previous job. For each
9group, a “box and whiskers” plot is used to summarize the entire distribution . The box
in each case represents the inter-quartile range (from the 25th to the 75th percentile)
and the “whiskers” above and below the box indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of
the distribution. The median is represented by the horizontal line across the box (in
some cases the median is the same as the 25th or 75th percentile in which case there
is no line). Extreme observations are represented by dots above and below the box and
whiskers (see for example, McGill, Tukey and Larsen, 1978). The most striking feature of
Figure 1 is that those in jobs that they report are “worse” than the job they lost exhibit
a distribution of proportional expenditure losses which is distinctly diﬀerent from those
who rate their jobs the same or better. Moreover, those in “worse” jobs have proportional
changes similar to those who are unemployed. Table 3 reports pair-wise t-tests of equality
of means and pair-wise Kruskal-Wallis (rank) tests of equality between the distributions
presented in Figure 1. These indicate that the statistical signiﬁcance of the patterns seen
in the ﬁgure. That groups UE-1, UE-2 and E-1 have the same distribution cannot be
rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels, but group E-2 has signiﬁcantly higher values.
As well as consumption we also consider income. Figure 2 suggests that the changes
in consumption are not simply a reﬂection of changes in income. While those in bad jobs
have larger income losses than those in good jobs, they have a smaller median income loss
than the unemployed. Table 4 conﬁrms (with t-tests and rank tests) that the distribution
of income changes among those in “worse” jobs is statistically diﬀerent both from the
distribution of expenditure changes among the other employed groups (in jobs rated the
same or better) and from those in their ﬁrst spell of unemployment.
10Figure 3 and Table 5 report on the savings rates of individuals in the four groups
deﬁned above.5 Here we see a striking and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
those in “worse” jobs and the unemployed: a higher saving rate. In fact, those in “worse”
jobs seem to be saving at the same rate as those in good jobs, despite the fact that the
former are in straightened circumstances - with considerable earnings losses.
T os u m m a r i z e ,t h eC O E Pd a t aa d dt oab o d yo fe v i d e n c ep o i n t i n gt ot h ei m p o r t a n c e
of temporary jobs and short-term employment during periods of labour market entry
and adjustment. They also bring to light a number of empirical patterns which have
received little (if any) attention to date. In particular, the data contain evidence of quits
into unemployed search. They also exhibit a striking pattern of consumption and savings
across labour market states. Displaced workers in subsequent short term employment
have low consumption and high savings.
Individually, these observations are compatible with a number of economic environ-
ments. For instance, models in which jobs are experience goods, as emphasized by Topel
and Ward (1992), can explain rapid turnover on labour market entry or after a job dis-
placement. On the other hand, these empirical patterns do not collectively match up
with a number of standard labour market speciﬁcations. But they do ﬁt the picture of
5The expenditure information in the COEP is collected by a series of recall questions. An analysis
of the responses, reported in Browning and Crossley (2002), determined that these questions suﬀered
from an under-reporting of expenditures - relative to income - and that this under-reporting was largely
independent of the level of expenditure. A corresponding adjustment is made in the calculation of the
savings rates displayed in Figure 3. Note, however, that this proportional adjustment makes no diﬀerence
to the pattern of savings rates across the four groups.
11credit constrained job seekers using short-term employment to ﬁnance consumption dur-
ing subsequent search. In the second half of the paper we present a model which captures
this idea more rigorously.
3 A Model of Short Term Employment and Asset
Accumulation
Time is continuous and inﬁnite. Agents make consumption and employment decisions
so as to maximize the expected value of discounted lifetime utility. Let u(·) represent
the worker’s risk averse preferences in each period. u(·) is continuous, diﬀerentiable and
bounded above with the standard Inada properties so that u0(·) > 0,u 00(·) < 0,u (0) = 0,
u0(0) = ∞, and u0(∞)=0 . At any time an unemployed agent can accept a low paying
job at a wage wL > 0. Such jobs are always available. Unemployed agents who forgo
the low wage sector (and only these) can search for higher paying employment with the
associated wage wH >w L. As discussed in the conclusions, the assumption that there
is no search on the ‘bad’ job is largely innocuous but convenient. Flow payments during
unemployed search from sources such as unemployment insurance are normalized to zero.
W h e nl o o k i n gf o raj o b ,aj o bs e e k e rr e c e i v e sah i g hw a g eo ﬀer with probability α. The
key feature here is that low wage jobs are easier to ﬁnd than high wage jobs. We assume
that once found, a high wage job lasts forever; this is an unattractive assumption but,
as discussed in the conclusions, it makes the model tractable enough for us to be able to
derive analytical results.
12Suppose that at time t a worker has assets At ≥ 0. Aw o r k e re n t e r i n gt h em a r k e tf o r
the ﬁrst time does so with assets A0 ≥ 0. Job seekers earn interest on these assets at
rate r which also equals the individual’s rate of time preference. Although accepting a
low wage job is costless, it is not costless to embark on search. Entrants into the market
who decide to search immediately as well as low wage workers who quit employment in
order to search pay a turnover cost K>0. Throughout this analysis we refer to the
end of a low wage job as a quit. It is important to note, however, that in this model no
information is revealed during low wage employment, and the timing of a quit is fully
anticipated at the start of a job. Thus in this model taking and then quitting an ongoing
job is equivalent to accepting a ﬁxed term contract of the same duration.
Turnover costs have a number of possible interpretations. For transitions from low
wage employment, the most immediate corresponds to an up-front search cost as well
as an exit cost borne by the worker. In the context presented here, a search or exit
cost of this sort is equivalent to an entry fee in the low wage sector properly adjusted
in present value terms.6 An alternative view is that these costs represent (round trip)
transportation costs between spatially distinct sectors, the low wage - full employment
and the high wage with search unemployment sectors. This perspective highlights the
similarities of this model with that of Harris and Todaro (1970). Here, however, the
economy explicitly accounts for the dynamic ﬂows between sectors. Of course, the act of
6As discussed below, a worker with suﬃciently high assets will initially search. In this case, there is
no exit from (or entry into) the low wage sector to generate the cost K. As the focus here is on ﬂows
between job search and low wage employment, this fault in the interpretation of K is of minor concern.
13changing sectors need not be explicitly spatial but nonetheless involve a transportation
cost.
Given this setting, consider ﬁrst the “partial” problem of a job seeker (an individual
in the job search process) with assets AD which are at this point given. AD ≥ 0 may diﬀer
from initial assets A0 if the worker initially participates in the low wage sector. While
looking for high wage employment, the worker’s problem is to choose the maximum
duration of search T (given a job is not found), a consumption path, ct for t ∈ [0,T],
and the asset level desired at the end of the search period, AT ≥ 0. These decisions are
made bearing in mind the opportunities of low wage employment, represented here by
the value of low wage employment, V (A).
As high paid jobs last forever, a worker with assets At in a high wage job will optimally
consume rAt + wH indeﬁnitely. The corresponding value of high wage employment is
therefore u(rAt + wH)/r. As a result, the searching worker’s problem can be written as7













7The objective function can be viewed as the limit of a related discrete time problem. Given a time
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Characterizing the value of working in low wage jobs, V (A), completes the speciﬁca-
tion of the worker’s decision problem. Workers in low wage employment have the option
o ft u r n i n ga ts o m et i m et oh i g hw a g ej o bs e a r c ha tac o s tK or remaining indeﬁnitely in
low wage employment with no intention of further search. A worker in low wage employ-
ment with initial assets A0 chooses a duration of employment D, a consumption pattern,
ςτ for τ ∈ [0,D], and a terminal level of assets AD ≥ 0. If the worker turns to high
wage job search (D<∞), terminal assets fund the turnover cost K and the subsequent
consumption while searching.
The worker’s problem is thus expressed by8:







8There are also implicit nonnegativity constraints on the choice variables. As discusssed below, these








−rDK =0 ( Budget Constraint)
and
e
−rD(AD − K) ≥ 0( Credit Constraint)
Substituting in for W(AD) as well as for AD in the budget constraint yields the
following problem
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163.1 Consumption Behavior
Associate Lagrange multipliers µ1 and µ2 with the budget and credit constraints respec-

















=0 τ ∈ [0,D]
These equations imply that (in the absence of on-the-job search) the individual will
choose constant consumption over this period.10 Denoting ¯ ς = ςτ for all τ ∈ [0,D] and
rearranging terms, the ﬁrst order conditions reduce to a single equation
u





−αsds − µ1 =0 (1)
9The asset equation for As implies that
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(wL − ςv)e−rvdv + wL − ςD
⎤
⎦
∂As/∂T = ∂As/∂AT =0
10In the adopted notation here, the indices t, τ and s do not necessarily correspond to chronological
time. For consumption during low wage employment, τ does at ﬁrst match real time but for consumption
while searching, ct, this index diﬀers from the date by D. Of course, if cycles of work and employment
occur, the index further diﬀers by a multiple of T + D.

















=0 t ∈ [0,T] (2)
From equation (1) and equation (2) for t =0 , consumption at the beginning of search
equals consumption during low wage employment (if low wage employment is taken on)
which in turn is less than or equal to the low wage plus initial asset income: c0 =¯ ς ≤
rA0+wL. It can also be established from (2) that consumption during search ct is strictly
positive for all t and decreasing over time. As search proceeds, consumption falls until
either a high wage job is found or search terminates with corresponding consumption cT.
If the worker chooses to cycle back and forth between low wage employment and high
wage job search, this consumption pattern implies that a jump in consumption occurs
when low wage temporary employment begins anew but not when the worker quits low
wage employment.
The jump at the end of search can be intuitively understood by considering the mar-
ginal value of using assets to ﬁnance an added unit of consumption today. When search-
ing, the opportunity cost of consuming a little more today is having to give up search
sooner. Toward the end of search, this means not being able to ﬁnance the search to-
morrow. On the other hand, when working at a low wage, the opportunity cost of a
little more consumption is getting back to future search a bit later. The discounting
of postponed search creates a wedge that generates the jump. At the other extreme of
quitting low wage employment, there is no such delay. The marginal value and therefore
18the level of consumption in the two states are equal.
Consumption during search can be characterized further. Provided that search occurs,
that is T>0, equation (2) generates the diﬀerential equation
˙ ct =
α[u0(ct) − u0(rAt + wH)]
u00(ct)
(3)
while the asset equation gives a second diﬀerential equation in assets and consumption
˙ At = rAt − ct (4)
Figure 4 illustrates the associated phase diagram along with the equations for ˙ At =0
and ˙ ct =0 . Since these stationary lines are parallel at a distance of wH from each other,
there are no stationary points in this system. Moreover, it is straightforward to establish
that the optimal solution lies between these two lines:
rAt <c t <r A t + wH.
As a result, for any terminal point (cT,A T), there is a unique path and any stable path
has decreasing assets and consumption over time.
193.2 Search and Employment Duration












































+µ1(rA0 + wL −¯ ς)=0
The remaining ﬁrst order conditions for duration of high wage search (T) and asset
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The primary interest here are consumer choices of ¯ ς,ct for t ∈ [0,T],D,T, and AT
in which workers move back and forth between low wage employment and job search
until ﬁnding a permanent high wage job. Of course, such a choice along with multipliers
(µ1,µ 2) must solve equations (1)-(9) for assets A0 = AT. However, not all solutions to
these necessary (but not suﬃcient) conditions are optimal choices. More speciﬁcally, note
that D = ∞ along with ςt =¯ ς = rA0 + wL is always a solution for an arbitrary level of
initial assets A0 ≥ 0. In this case, ct,T,A T are undetermined as search does not occur.
Therefore to establish existence of the type of solution of interest, we ﬁnd conditions
which rule out this solution and other alternatives.
The following claim establishes suﬃcient conditions on wages and turnover costs under
which the D = ∞ solution to the ﬁrst order conditions is suboptimal. Wages in the good
jobs must be suﬃciently high to make search attractive while the turnover costs must be




(u(rA0 + wH) − u(rA0 + wL)) − u
0(rA0 + wL)wL > 0,
21then a worker will at some point switch to high wage job search (D<∞) given suﬃciently
small but strictly positive K.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x
On the other hand, there may be no transiti o nf r o mh i g hw a g es e a r c hi n t ol o ww a g e
employment. If search is very attractive, it may be optimal to search indeﬁnitely, T = ∞.
In this case, the job seeker runs down assets (recall that ct >r A t) so that consumption
becomes arbitrarily small as time proceeds.11 This action is ruled out when wages in
good jobs are not “too attractive.”
Claim 2 If α
r+αu(wH) <u (wL),t h e nT<∞.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x
While Claim 1 establishes conditions for not remaining permanently in low wage
employment with assets A0, it does not demonstrate that a worker with these assets will
necessarily take on and then later quit a low wage job. Given A0, aw o r k e rm a yf o r g o
low wage employment altogether and search immediately. Indeed, for some initial asset
levels, low wage employment (accompanied by asset accumulation) is undesirable. Upon
entering the market, it may be optimal to set D =0 .12 Of course, following a period of
11Letting the u(0) normalization (currently equal to zero) decrease will lower the attractiveness of
search when assets are low thereby easing the conditions under which cycles exist.
12For assets less than K this is not feasible since the subsequent search does not occur: T =0 . For A0
greater than some critical value this will indeed be a solution. More speciﬁcally, if workers begin with
diﬀerent endowments, A0, those with high levels of initial assets will immediately search for high wages
and only take up low wage jobs when high wage search is unsuccessful. On the other hand, workers with
low endowments will accumulate assets before search (D>0).
22high wage job search, setting D =0is wasteful. A worker who discontinues high wage
search to move into low wage employment with assets AT will not then set D =0when
solving V (AT). Acting in this way involves paying an avoidable turnover cost K.13
To assess what happens after pursuing of a good job, suppose a worker concludes
search with assets AT. In general, given AT it may be optimal to set D = ∞. If, however,
the condition in Claim 1 holds at AT, then the worker will take on low wage employment
for a only ﬁnite, strictly positive duration after which the worker will search yet again.
This pattern suggests that temporary low wage employment cycles could emerge if the
condition in Claim 1 holds over a range of assets. Claim 3 goes even further. It shows
that if the condition holds more generally, then at the end of unsuccessful search, an




(u(rA+ wH) − u(rA+ wL)) − u
0(rA+ wL)wL > 0 ∀ A ∈ [0,A 0]
then AT =0
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x
When the conditions in Claims 2 and 3 simultaneously hold, the (repeated) pattern
of low wage employment followed by high wage job search emerges. Moreover, since
these two conditions are not exclusive (examples are easy to ﬁnd), cycles can emerge.
13Likewise T =0is not part of an optimal plan as this strategy also involves paying a transition fee
without any possible payoﬀ from search.
23Regardless of initial assets, workers will (with some probability) search until assets are
used up. At this point, Claim 1 establishes that they will not take a low wage job
permanently. Claim 2 establishes they will not search with zero assets. Instead they will
take on low wage employment for a ﬁnite period after which they search. If unsuccessful,
this search will terminate with zero assets at which point the process begins anew.14 In
other words, the solution to V (0) is such that workers cycle indeﬁnitely between low wage
employment and high wage job search until they ultimately ﬁnd a high wage job, thereby
establishing the central result of this section.
This cyclical pattern of employment can be illustrated from the value functions. As
depicted in Figure 5, the value of high wage search, W(A), is strictly increasing and
concave in assets A whereas the value of low wage employment, V (A), is everywhere
increasing but linear over the range of assets involving savings. (Derivations are shown
in the proof of Claim 3 in the Appendix.) In Figure 5, starting from assets A =0 , a
cycle begins with the accumulation to AD assets and the corresponding progression up
along V (A). Upon reaching AD, the individual becomes indiﬀerent between low wage
employment and moving to search: V (AD)=W(AD − K). Here, a smooth pasting-type
condition holds in which the value functions have the same slope, V 0(AD)=W0(AD−K).
As search proceeds assets decline from this point. The individual moves down along
W(A) until assets are exhausted at which point the individual switches: V (0) = W(0).
With a binding credit constraint, the marginal return to an additional asset is strictly
greater under search than in low wage employment but the ﬁxed cost K deters the
14For completeness, erratic patterns in which the choices of D and T vary can also be dismissed.
24individual from working a very short period. Instead the process repeats itself until a
high wage job is ultimately found.
W h e nt h ec r e d i tc o n s t r a i n td o e sn o tb i n d(AT > 0), the solution is less involved.
After any period of job search, the worker abandons the high wage market preferring
(permanent) low wage employment. This switch occurs at a point of indiﬀerence which
smoothly links W(A) and V (A) through a tangency condition. Speciﬁcally, if AT > 0
after an initial period of search, then W(AT)=V (AT) and W0(AT)=V 0(AT) which
further implies that D = ∞.A T =0is a necessary element of cyclical job quits.
3.3 Turnover Costs
How does consumption and the duration of job search respond to a change in turnover
costs? Do job seekers begin search with higher assets? What are the consequences for
unemployment? Since asset accumulation and job quits occur only in the case where
workers who terminate job search do so when the credit constraint binds (AT =0 ) , when
considering these eﬀects it is suﬃcient to concentrate on the case in which initial and
terminal assets are zero.
As shown in the Appendix, in this cycle consumption during low wage employment
increases with turnover costs implying that the initial level of consumption during search
also rises:
∂c0/∂K = ∂¯ ς/∂K >0.
On the other hand, consumption at the end of high wage job search declines with turnover
25costs: ∂cT/∂K < 0.
These results determine the changes in employment and search durations. Since the
j o bs e a r c hp h a s ed i a g r a mf o rct and At is independent of turnover costs, an increased
initial consumption c0 along with decreased terminal consumption cT implies that the new
solution is on lower path but with larger ﬁrst period consumption. Given higher initial
consumption, it follows that assets rise at the outset of high wage search: ∂AD/∂K > 0.
On the lower trajectory, consumption for a given asset level falls:
∂c(At)/∂K < 0.
With more assets being consumed at a slower rate, the duration of search necessarily
rises15: ∂T/∂K > 0. As consumption during low wage employment rises, the rate of asset
accumulation declines. However, at the termination of the low wage job at time D, the
worker starts high wage job search with higher consumption - recall that c0 has increased.
From the phase diagram, the worker must arrive with higher assets, AD. To accumulate a
larger asset level with a slower accumulation rate requires that the duration of low wage
employment increases: ∂D/∂K > 0.
Increased turnover costs diminishes a worker’s willingness to engage in search.16 As
15Consumption as a function of the length or duration of search is in general ambiguous: ∂ct/∂K T 0.
For low levels of t this derivative is clearly positive as ∂ct=0/∂K > 0 but depending on risk aversion, the
decline in consumption may be more rapid under higher turnover costs so that this derivative becomes
negative.
16If turnover costs are zero, workers would work at bad jobs and then search for inﬁnesimally short
periods. For K =0 , a “chattering” solution between employment and search results.
26search becomes more distant, low wage workers who are accumulating assets in order to
eventually seek high wage employment become less willing to sacriﬁce today for more
remote rewards. Low wage workers stay longer and consume more in low wage jobs.
When they do switch to job search, they arrive prepared to search longer to oﬀset the
possibility of future turnover costs. They do so by arriving with higher assets and by
consuming less given asset levels.
3.4 Wages
The individual’s response to wages is less transparent, with results primarily available
for initial and terminal consumption. It is straightforward to establish that a pay rise in
bad jobs increases consumption during low wage employment. Likewise, consumption at
the end of high wage job search rises with low wages:
∂c0/∂wL = ∂¯ ς/∂wL > 0; ∂cT/∂wL > 0
(See the Appendix for details.) As low wage pay wL does not aﬀect the phase diagram,
the new consumption path is a higher trajectory accompanied by a higher initial value.
Consumption given assets rises ∂c(At)/∂wL > 0; however, although c0 has risen it is not
possible to graphically determine whether assets at t =0are higher. Given a small rise
in initial consumption on the new path, the duration of search will fall. For a suﬃciently
l a r g er i s ew eg e tt h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect. Given this ambiguity, it is not possible to tell (at
27this point) the eﬀects on employment or search duration as well as asset accumulation.17
Although increased consumption reﬂects higher income from bad jobs, it is unclear how
individuals alter the allocation of time between work and search.
The individual’s response to changes in the high wage is less revealing. As pay in
good jobs improves, initial as well as terminal consumption both decrease:
∂c0/∂wH = ∂¯ ς/∂wH < 0; ∂cT/∂wH < 0
With more attractive good jobs, low wage workers save at a higher rate in order to fa-
cilitate search. Now, however, the phase diagram shifts with wH changes. For a given
the terminal condition, there is higher consumption at each asset level - the consump-
tion paths rotate upward. As such, little can be inferred regarding consumption while
searching. Workers consume less toward the end of search activity (when assets are
low) reﬂecting the greater return to search. Consumption at the outset of search is also
lower although the way in which consumption given relatively high assets responds is
undetermined. Likewise, the steeper path is balanced by a fall in initial and terminal
consumption so working out the duration of search and the initial asset level cannot be
done diagrammatically.
17Analytically, these eﬀects depend on the solution of diﬀerential equation solution for ct.G i v e nt h e
structure of this diﬀerential equation, the outcome is likely to depend on third derivatives for u(ct).
284C o n c l u s i o n s .
If access to credit is limited (especially when young or unemployed) but “bad” jobs are
easy to come by, then job seekers can use short term employment in such undesirable
jobs as a way to ﬁnance consumption during subsequent unemployed search for “good”
jobs. This paper provides both an empirical exploration and a theoretical exploration of
this idea. The empirical analysis presented above adds to a small but growing literature
that documents the importance of short-term and temporary employment to new entrants
and displaced workers. It also draws out some aspects of labour market transitions that
have received little attention. First, the data contradict the notion that quits into unem-
ployment do not occur. Second, the consumption levels of temporary workers are starkly
diﬀerent from those back in “good” jobs and very similar to current searchers. Their
savings behavior is quite diﬀerent: savings rates among the less satisﬁed employed are as
high or higher than those back in “good” jobs (and much higher than the unemployed).
Although somewhat at odds with conventional views of the labour market, these
observations line up well with the model presented here. In an economy with credit
constraints, readily available low paying jobs and more diﬃcult to ﬁnd high paying jobs,
individuals may work in “bad” jobs to accumulate assets which subsequently fund search
for “good” jobs. Workers in this economy, of course, prefer high wage employment but
to secure one of these good jobs they must ﬁrst engage in uncertain search. To ﬁnance
consumption during this search, job seekers eat into assets - debt ﬁnancing is not available.
To some extent workers without assets can overcome the credit constraint by accepting
low paying jobs. Such employment is readily available but hinders the ability to search for
29high pay work. Low wage jobs therefore become temporary positions that fund subsequent
job search. If the ensuing search is unsuccessful, workers repeat their asset accumulation
in low wage employment. As a result, voluntary planned quits occur in a cyclical pattern
that provides an explanation for a series of short job durations (at low wages) followed
by employment at high wages.
Although the fundamental contribution of the model is to demonstrate, analytically,
a mechanism for endogenous quits, the cyclical migration between sectors also provides
insights into Harris-Todaro (1970) economies. While looking for good jobs, workers trade
oﬀ the beneﬁts of immediately available low wage work against those of unemployment.
Here, however, there are explicit ﬂows between sectors as workers move in and out of low
wage employment. Wages and the costs of moving across sectors determine the size of
these ﬂows. Low turnover costs generate rapid movements between high wage job search
and low wage employment.
Job turnover crucially relies on a ﬁnancial market imperfection, the no-debt con-
straint. The credit constraint thus has new implications for the distribution of income.
In the literature, it has been shown that borrowing constraints can aﬀect the distribution
of income by restricting human capital investment choices. Here, capital market imper-
fections have further implications for the distribution of income as they alter job ﬂows.
Without constraints, workers are of course better oﬀ ex ante although ex post some will
be unlucky and be resigned to low wage employment with debts.
Like all models, ours involves a number of abstractions, two of which merit further
discussion. First, we assume no on-the-job search. This is clearly extreme. All that
30is required is that unemployed search be suﬃciently more productive than on-the-job
search. It is easy to imagine circumstances where unemployed search oﬀers considerable
advantages over on-the-job search. Among these is the possibility that an unemployed
worker can travel to search in a distant labour markets. In this case, the turnover cost
in our model (paid when search commences) has a natural interpretation as a travel cost
as discussed in Section 3. It is interesting to note that in the data, respondents who quit
(including those who quit for reasons other than to take another job) have relatively high
rates of geographic mobility.
The second abstraction which merits comment is the assumption that good jobs last
forever (that is, as in Danforth (1979), there is an absorbing state). Obviously, if one
thinks about displaced workers, this is an assumption one would prefer to do without.
This technical convenience, however, greatly simpliﬁes the analysis and allows us to obtain
analytical results. Models of search and consumption with exogenous job destruction can
be studied numerically (see, for example, Algan et al., (2003), Lentz (2002), and Rendon
(2002)), but obtaining analytical results has proved diﬃcult.18 Lentz and Tranaes (2003)
present an interesting alternative: they introduce a wealth lottery to ensure concavity of
the value function. To do without any such technical assumptions is currently beyond
our abilities.
There are other abstractions as well. Labour market opportunities are certainly more
varied than described, and we have not included realistic features of unemployment in-
surance systems in our analysis. Stripping down the set-up allows us to highlight the
18These papers do not demonstrate the cyclical savings mechanism derived in this paper.
31critical roles played by wage diﬀerentials, credit constraints, and turnover costs, and to
prove that cycles of search and employment can arise in such an economy. Including
more features would obscure this focus but would most likely not undermine the central
results of the paper. Such extensions are also required if we wish to bring the theory to
the data in a satisfactory way.
These abstractions not withstanding, we note that the turnover generated by the
model provides an explanation for the propensity of recent job losers to take temporary
work - as reported by Farber (1997) and demonstrated here in Canadian data. These
episodes of temporary work detract from time spent searching for a “good” job, and hence
provide a partial explanation for the persistence of earnings losses after displacement that
have been documented by Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) and others. The model
generates the pattern of high savings and low consumption by workers in temporary jobs
that we documented in the COEP data. Finally, the model also suggests a relationship
between assets at job loss and the duration of initial search, as has been recently investi-
gated in Stancanelli (1999), Bloemen and Stancanelli, (2001), Bloemen, (2002) and Algan
et al. (2003).
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35APPENDIX:
P r o o fo fC l a i m s1 - 3
Claim 1:F o ra n yﬁxed ¯ D where 0 < ¯ D<∞, deﬁne




































−r( ¯ D+T)A0 ≥ 0
and
(ii) e
−r( ¯ D+T)AT ≥ 0
for K =0 . This is the basic decision problem but with exogenous D,T,AT = A0 and
permanent low wage employment after job search - V (AT)=u(rA0+wL)/r. As such the
same ﬁrst order conditions (1) and (2) continue to apply along with the budget constraint.
To establish that it is optimal to search when K is small, it is suﬃcient to establish
that
∆ ≡ V ¯ D(A0;T) − u(rA0 + wL)/r > 0
for some T>0. Evaluated at T =0 ,V ¯ D(A0;T)|T=0 = u(rA0 + wL)/r and hence ∆ =0 .
36Moreover, diﬀerentiation of V ¯ D(A0;T) and the budget constraint evaluated at the optimal




























Therefore, ∆ > 0 for some T>0 given the assumed condition. QED
Claim 2:S i n c e ct >r A t, if search is ﬁnitely long then lim
t→∞AT =0 .G i v e n At =0 ,
consumption equals zero during search: ct =0 . For search not to be too attractive, it
is suﬃcient to establish that at some point the worker must strictly prefer low wage
employment over search with zero consumption. If the worker chooses to never move into











A worker with zero assets can always work indeﬁnitely at a low wage job with payoﬀ:
u(wL)/r. Given these options, the result follows. QED
Claim 3: To prove this claim, we establish four intermediate results. Recall that the
assumptions in Claims 1 and 2 ensure that 0 <T<∞ and D<∞.
37Lemma 4 V 0(A0)=u0(c0)







































































































































































39from equation (1). QED
Lemma 5 If AT > 0, then V 00(AT) < 0













Likewise diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst order condition














Combining yields the desired result:
V
00(AT)=




Lemma 6 If D>0, then V 00(A0)=0
40Proof:I fD>0, then ¯ ς is well deﬁned and satisﬁes
rV(A0)=u(¯ ς)+u





00(¯ ς)(rA0 + wL −¯ ς)
d¯ ς
dA0









Lemma 7 Given A0 > 0,A T <A 0.
Proof:
Case 1: D =0 . As 0 <T<∞ and ct >r A t,A T <A 0 follows immediately.






Notice that AD >A T by the logic used in Case 1. Individuals with assets A ∈ [A0,A D)




0( ˜ A) ∀ A, ˜ A ∈ [A0,A D).
41Since 0 <T<∞,c 0 >c t. Moreover, AT > 0 implies µ2 =0so that V 0(AT)=u0(cT).







These lemmas are now used to establish the claim. Suppose AT > 0. By Lemma
5, V 00(AT) < 0. By Lemma 7, AT <A 0. F r o mL e m m a6a n dC l a i m1 ,V 00(AT)=0 , a
contradiction. QED
Comparative Static Calculations
For the analysis here let A0 = AT =0 . These asset levels although optimal can be
treated as exogenous in which case equations (7) and (9) become unused. At this point
it is useful to deﬁne V, the value of starting (and completing) a cycle of low wage work
followed by search for high wage employment where initial and terminal assets equal zero
























where the choice variables, ¯ ς,ct,T and D e q u a lt h e i ro p t i m a lv a l u e sa sd e ﬁned by the
ﬁrst order conditions (1), (2), (5), (6) and (8).
42Rearranging the equations produces separate equations for ¯ ς and cT as functions of
V and exogenous parameters
rV − u(¯ ς) − u




u(wH) − (r + α)V − u
0(cT)cT =0 (12)





0(rAS + wH + wF)e
−αsds = u
0(¯ ς)



















00(¯ ς)[wL −¯ ς] · d¯ ς − u
0(¯ ς) · dwL =0
43Plugging in for rdV gives
d¯ ς =
1






















0(wH) · dwH − (r + α) · dV − u
00(cT)cT · dcT =0 .







0(¯ ς) · dK
−(1 − e
−rD)u




















Table 1: Separation Reasons and Unemployment
initial jobless search search expenditures
spell, weeks search hours / week $ / week
median % mean* mean*
Layoﬀ due to:
business conditions 7 72% 15 34
temporary job / contract ended 9 69% 13 32
job was seasonal 12 66% 12 36
other 5 63% 14 31
Quit
to take another job <1 16% 12 23
other 6 58% 15 32
Dismissed or Fired 7 84% 17 31
Illness or Injury 10 31% 17 52
Other 3 52% 14 39
Not stated 3 76% 16 20
* mean conditional on searching
45Table 1: Separation Reasons and Unemployment, Continued
geographic UI # % of
move receipt obs. Sample
Layoﬀ due to:
business conditions 6% 73% 1,847 25
temporary job / contract ended 7% 73% 1,679 23
job was seasonal 6% 71% 859 12
other 5% 70% 390 5
Quit
to take another job 14% 18% 665 9
other 19% 20% 541 7
Dismissed or Fired 8% 51% 207 3
Illness or Injury 5% 61% 386 5
Other 9% 51% 754 10
Not stated 0 28% 25 <1
46Table 2: First Interview Employment Status (3rd Quarter after Job Loss)
1. First Spell of Unemployment (UE-1) 33.3%
2. Subsequent Spell of Unemployed (UE-2) 18.2%
3. First Spell of Post-displacement Employment 37.6%
4. Subsequent Spell of Post-displacement Employment 10.9%
Of 3 :
(A) Not Expecting Job to Last 1 Year 11.0% (29.3%)
(B) Expecting Job to Last 1 Year 26.6% (70.8%)
(i) Current Job Worse Than Job Displaced From 9.4% (24.9%)
(ii) The Same or More Satisﬁed with Current Job 28.2% (75.1%)
––—
Total Temporary Work: 2.+4.+3.(A) 40.1%
Total Temporary Work: 2.+4.+3.(i) 38.5%
47Table 3: Pair-wise Rank- and t- tests of Common Expenditure Change Distribution
UE-2 E-1 E-2
















Notes. The boxes give
diﬀerence in means: t-stat p-value
KW rank test: χ2 (1) p-value
48Table 4: Pair-wise Rank- and t-tests of Common Income Change Distribution
UE-2 E-1 E-2
















49Table 5: Pair-wise Rank- and t-tests of Common Savings Rate Distribution
UE-2 E-1 E-2
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Figure 5: The Cyclical Pattern of Quits
.
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